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RESUMO 
O mentalismo é uma orientação à explicação causal do comportamento em que as causas são inferidas como 
estruturas não observáveis, pertencentes a domínios não comportamentais. Tipicamente, essas estruturas são tidas como 
subjacentes ao comportamento, e o domínio em questão é o da “mente”.  Em alguns casos, com algumas exceções, o 
mentalismo dialoga com a psicologia tradicional ou com o dualismo de substância. Os argumentos em prol das explicações 
mentais subscritos aos níveis teórico e conceitual não levam em consideração a fonte das referidas explicações.  A análise do 
comportamento se opõe ao mentalismo por razões pragmáticas, ao invés de ontológicas: o mentalismo impede uma análise do 
comportamento genuína, que possa contribuir no âmbito da previsão e do controle, por confundir os cientistas ao induzi-los a 
aceitar explicações inefetivas acerca do seu objeto de estudo. 
Palavras-chave: análise do comportamento, explicação, mentalismo, método científico, comportamento verbal.  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Mentalism is an orientation to the causal explanation of behavior in which the causes are inferred to be unobservable 
structures from a non-behavioral domain. Typically, the structures are held to underlie behavior, and the domain is that of 
“mind.”   In some but not all cases, mentalism subscribes to traditional psychophysical or substance dualism.  Arguments that 
mental explanations are at the theoretical or conceptual level fail to consider the source of the explanation in question.  
Behavior analysts oppose mentalism on pragmatic, rather than ontological grounds:  mentalism impedes a genuine science of 
behavior contributing to prediction and control by misleading scientists and inducing them to accept ineffective explanations 
of their subject matter. 
Key words: behavior analysis, explanation, mentalism, scientific method, theory, verbal behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________ 
This article is taken from material I developed over the years to help in my own teaching on the explanatory practices of mentalism and 
behavior analysis. I offer it here in the hope others will find it useful.  In keeping with the instructional goal of the article, references are at 
a minimum.  In addition, both the language and the arguments are more informal than in other articles. If I have fallen short in the 
execution, I apologize and ask for the reader’s tolerance. I can only say the contingencies haven’t finished with me yet. Correspondence 
concerning the article should be addressed to the author at jcm@uwm.edu, or at his home address:  1861 E. Fox Lane; Fox Point, WI 
53217; USA. 
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A COMPARISON OF THE EXPLANATORY PRACTICES 
OF MENTALISM AND BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 
 
Mentalism is the dominant orientation in 
contemporary psychology to the causal explanation of 
behavior.  Mentalism can take many forms, from (a) 
Freudian personality development and psychopathology; to 
(b) contemporary cognitive, information processing 
psychology; to (c) contemporary social psychology; to (d) 
contemporary medical model views of behavioral pathology 
as represented in DSM-V. The present article reviews the 
principal features of mentalism and compares its explanatory 
practices with those of behavior analysis.  Because of the 
great range of mentalistic positions, the present review is 
necessarily abstract in many instances, but it can be applied 
in particular cases with suitable modification. 
 
A DEFINITION OF MENTALISM 
We speak of an explanation as mentalistic when it 
involves the following features: 
 That the proper goal of psychological science is to 
postulate a set of acts, states, mechanisms, processes, 
entities, and structures whose functional properties make 
possible whatever form of behavior is of interest.  
Henceforth, we use simply one term: structures. 
 That these structures are part of the intrinsic 
psychological make-up of the organism. An organism 
does not acquire them during its lifetime through 
experience with the environment in any substantial way.  
For example, they may be developmental or 
evolutionary. 
 Physiological measures provide neural correlates 
and evidence of the underlying mental structures, but 
don’t define them.  The structures are defined by their 
functional properties, such as capacities, contents, 
processing times, and so forth, rather than their physical 
realization or observable expression.  The structures 
afford competence, which makes the observed behavior 
possible in whatever situation the organism finds itself.  
Finally, the behaving organism is not necessarily 
consciously aware of the operation of these mental 
structures. 
 That the structures are inferred and underlying, 
rather than observable.   
 That the structures and their properties may be 
regarded as causal, and the specification of the structures, 
their functional properties, and the architecture of the 
system as a whole, even at the conceptual level, 
constitutes the causal explanation of behavior. 
The presumed locus of these structures varies with 
different versions of mentalism.  In some versions, the 
structures are inferred to be inside the organism in some 
sense, perhaps as manifestations of cortical structures.  In 
other cases, they are inferred to be at the conceptual level, 
and it is no more meaningful to ask where the locus is of 
some inferred structure or property than it is to ask where the 
locus is of the horsepower of an internal combustion engine.  
However, various forms of observable data (i.e., evidence) 
are taken to support this inferential project, ranging from 
behavioral (reaction time, eye tracking, ratiocination, 
perceptual judgments) to physiological (fMRI, PET, action 
potentials and synaptic mechanisms in cortical structures or 
pathways). In this regard, observable behavior is relevant 
because it provides evidence to support inferences about the 
causal properties of mental structures, rather than because it 
is a subject matter in its own right. 
Again, mentalism implicitly assumes that an 
organism’s psychological make-up includes a domain 
beyond the one in which behavior takes place. The domain 
of an explanation is of concern when its analytic concepts 
and its methods of observation are unrelated to the 
behavioral facts for which they are said to account. 
Representative descriptors for this non-behavioral domain 
are mental, cognitive, subjective, spiritual, psychic, 
conceptual, hypothetical - in short, the domain of “mind.” 
Different versions of mentalism emphasize different terms 
related to this inferred domain. 
Mentalism also entails a commitment to the 
inferred mental structures from the non-behavioral domain 
as causally effective antecedents. Observable environmental 
events, variables, and relations are also antecedents for 
behavior, but for mentalism they are not causes of behavior.  
At best they are only triggers for the underlying causal 
structures. First, the organism and its behavior are assumed 
to be in direct contact with only the mental structures or their 
outputs, rather than environmental factors. How can 
something with which the organism is not in direct contact 
be considered causal? Second, behavior is richer and more 
flexible than an account in terms of observable 
environmental factors allows. Consider the sequential 
organization of behavior as an example.  Such behavior does 
not consist of a mere chain of concatenated reflexes.  Rather, 
sequential behavior is richer and more flexible.  It follows 
that the independent variables must be at least as rich and 
flexible as the dependent variable, meaning that an 
explanation in terms of the causal properties of underlying 
mental structures is necessary.  
The functional properties of the causal mental 
structures differ for versions of mentalism, and typically 
range from initiating to mediating. By initiating we mean 
that the structures themselves are held to be the source of the 
behavior, such that no cause beyond the structures is 
necessary to explain the behavior. By mediating we mean 
that observable external stimuli activate or trigger one or 
more unobservable intervening or mediating structures that 
are held to be causally connected in some complex but 
systematic way to an ensuing observable response. Often 
mental explanations resemble the S – O – R approach that is 
found in the history of behaviorism, where the O stands for 
explicitly non-behavioral, “organismsic” variables that are 
inferred to mediate the relation between S and R and provide 
the desired richness and flexibility.  However, mentalism 
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argues it is vastly superior in explanatory scope to 
behaviorism because its mental mediators are vastly superior 
to those in behaviorism. 
In any event, the properties of these causal mental 
structures cannot be characterized in the same terms, and do 
not function according to the same principles as observable 
events, variables, and relations in the environment.  
Sometimes the structures are assumed to either have or to 
produce a content on which other structures or processes 
operate, in the sense of the flowchart of a computer program, 
but again their contributions are not materially and uniquely 
determined by an organism’s experience.  Mentalism applies 
whether the domain and its causal structures are said to be 
materialistic or dualistic (i.e., metaphysical or substance 
dualism). 
Recognizing that different forms of mentalism 
conceive of the causal properties of underlying structures in 
different ways, we can see that for mentalism, a causal 
explanation of behavior is incomplete at best and defective 
at worst if it deploys only concepts from the observable 
behavioral domain, such as observable environmental 
events, variables, and relations. To be sure, an organism 
experiences observable environmental events, variables, and 
relations during its lifetime, but for mentalism these 
environmental factors are only matters of performance. They 
are not causes, and the theoretical understanding and 
explanation of behavior appropriate to science cannot be 
achieved in terms of these factors. 
Mentalists often argue that their point of view 
follows from the history of science. According to mentalists, 
progress in science has always been achieved by inferring 
theoretically rich analytic and explanatory concepts that are 
unobservable, rather than by limiting analyses and 
explanations to events, variables, and relations that are 
observable. Representative examples are atoms, electrons, 
cell theory, germ theory of disease, receptor sites.  None of 
these explanatory concepts were directly observed at the 
time they were first inferred.  The mentalist argument is they 
all illustrate why science should not be restricted to 
observable events, variables, and relations.  Prediction and if 
necessary control will naturally follow as a consequence of 
inferring the underlying, unobservable structures that are the 
genuine concern of science, but prediction and control are 
matters of engineering. The various forms of mentalism such 
as cognitive psychology simply do the same as all genuine 
theoretically oriented sciences and infer these underlying, 
unobservable phenomena, then try to demonstrate the 
validity of the inferences through research. 
To be sure, mentalism endorses the position that 
science seeks explanations.  For mentalism, explanations are 
statements that provide a basis for a theoretical 
understanding of the causal mechanisms or principles 
postulated to underlie the events we observe. A longstanding 
epistemological assumption of mentalism is that scientific 
explanations may begin but they do not end with our 
observations. Rather, scientific explanations must appeal to 
underlying factors that are part of a domain that differs from 
the observable domain. Again, the mentalist argument is that 
the history of science suggests science has always 
progressed by looking beyond or behind what we observe to 
make statements about underlying causal factors that have 
not been directly observed.  At best the study of observable 
factors in an event is useful to the extent it provides a basis 
for supporting inferences about those underlying factors as 
the true causes of an event. Thus, in the case of behavior and 
such other psychological phenomena as learning, perception, 
and memory, the true causes are the underlying structures 
that yield the capability for behavior in particular 
circumstances and provide competence. To study the 
relation between observable factors in an event is only to 
describe performance and how the event came about, not 
explain why it came about. 
How then are we to reconcile the view that the 
underlying mental structures necessary for explanation are 
unobservable with the view that science deals only with 
publicly observable phenomena? For mentalism, the 
problem is not as severe as it appears. Science often deals 
with things it cannot directly see or measure. For mentalism, 
the unobservable mental structures may be operationally 
defined as hypothetical constructs. Science may then deal 
with them indirectly, at the conceptual level through what 
are taken to be their manifestations, and thereby generate 
true explanations. On this view, researchers and theorists 
should be free to postulate whatever underlying mental 
structures and so on are suitable to explain the observation in 
question, and then gather data that address the adequacy of 
their postulations. For mentalists, behaviorism seeks 
explanations limited to observables, and is surely 
inadequate.  Mentalism is richer and preferable because it 
admits explanatory concepts that are richer and preferable, 
precisely because they are not restricted to observables. 
As suggested above, mentalists contrast their 
position directly with behaviorism.  According to mentalists, 
behavioral explanations are expressed solely in terms of 
observable environmental events, variables, and S – R 
relations. Consequently, behavioral explanations focus 
solely on describing performance—“What happened?” 
Mentalists hold that such explanations are incomplete at best 
because they don’t specify the underlying, unobservable 
causal structures responsible for the performance. Rather, 
appropriate explanations need to answer questions of “Why 
did it happen?” in the sense of “What underlying structure is 
responsible?” The assumption is that if the underlying 
theoretical structure hasn’t been postulated, the behavior 
hasn’t been truly explained.  Therefore, behaviorism can’t 
possibly be regarded as generating genuinely theoretical, 
explanatory knowledge, and can’t possibly be regarded as 
genuinely scientific. 
According to mentalism, everyone knows humans 
have minds, which are unobservable.  In a general sense, 
mind may be understood as the set of mental structures that 
mediate behavior in particular circumstances.  As the 
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saying goes, mind is what the brain does.  The functional 
properties of these mental structures are innate and not 
markedly influenced by experience. If they were, they 
would be behavioral and descriptive, rather than mental 
and genuinely explanatory.  Any account of human 
behavior that claims to be an explanation and that doesn’t 
include the role of unobservable theoretical structures such 
as the mind cannot possibly be adequate. 
Accounts of the behavior of non-humans, such as 
laboratory rats and pigeons, or of humans with 
developmental disabilities, in terms of unobservable 
theoretical structures are not necessarily problematic. 
However, accounts of the behavior of typically developing 
or developed humans must surely appeal to their minds. 
Extensions of accounts pertaining to human society and 
culture must also surely appeal to minds and underlying 
mental structures. 
In sum, mentalism argues that mind is necessary 
for psychological explanations, and mind can be dealt with 
in a scientifically acceptable way.  
 
BEHAVIOR ANALYTIC VIEW OF SCIENCE 
How then does behavior analysis stand with 
respect to these many matters?  Clearly, one of the major 
differences between mentalism and behavior analysis turns 
on the different conceptions of the causal explanation of 
behavior. 
We start by suggesting that for behavior analysis, 
science is in large measure the operant behavior of 
scientists, along with (a) the artifacts associated with the 
origin and the execution of their behavior and (b) the 
artifacts produced by their behavior.  Accordingly, 
scientific behavior ranges from ongoing research activities 
in the laboratory to talking and writing about those 
activities. The artifacts associated with the origin and the 
execution of their behavior range from the scientific 
apparatus we use in those research activities, such as test 
tubes, scales, microscopes, and so on, to the established 
data base and codified methods of scientific procedures.  
The artifacts produced by their behavior range from new 
scientific apparatus, such as new scales and microscopes, 
to extensions of published research, refinements of 
theories, alternative explanations, and new interpretations. 
Moreover, the reinforcers for the operant behavior 
of science fall on a continuum. At one end is the prediction 
and control of natural events. At this end we are concerned 
with shaping nature as on an anvil and deriving outcomes 
that are reinforcing for us, through our direct, practical 
action.  At the other end is the discovery of uniformities, 
the ordering of confusing data, and the resolution of 
puzzlement.  At this end we are concerned with the 
generalized and abstract verbal products of science, such as 
theories, explanations, and interpretations that transcend 
particular instances of prediction and control.  These 
abstract products are derived from more particular 
endeavors, and they become progressively more abstract as 
science and technology progress. 
Primitive science presumably began with 
primitive technologies: making clay pots, making hammers 
and swords, making clothing, making houses, making 
transportation devices, domesticating animals, selectively 
breeding plants and animals.  Cultures then developed rules 
for transmitting acquired knowledge about these 
technologies to future generations. The rules became 
formalized as sources of discriminative control. 
Over time, the rules became more generalized and 
abstract, with increased degrees of freedom for their 
application - different kinds of clay for pots, different kinds 
of metals for hammers and swords, different sources of 
material for clothing, different ways to domesticate 
animals.  The important point is that the verbal behavior of 
science falls on a pragmatic continuum ranging from (a) 
rules of craftsmen, to (b) functional relations, to (c) higher 
order analytic and explanatory concepts, to (d) theories, 
laws, explanations, and interpretations. At one end of the 
continuum, the principal concern is direct, practical, 
effective action in particular cases. At the other end, the 
principal concern is tacting order and uniformities at an 
abstract, generalized level, based on organizations of data.  
Theories and explanations may be understood as derived 
and extended from a foundation of functional relations. 
The mere accumulation of results is no more valuable as a 
theory than a heap of stones is valuable as a house (e.g., 
Poincaré). Data become useful when organized, so that 
they can inform outcomes. 
One important concern here is the nature of the 
contingencies that influence scientific behavior. To what 
extent is scientific behavior influenced by contingencies 
arising from (a) operations and contacts with data that 
result in effective action with respect to nature—such as 
prediction and control, as opposed to contingencies arising 
from (b) social and cultural traditions, (c) mischievous 
linguistic processes sometimes called reification, and (d) 
inappropriate metaphors? 
Another way to assess the nature of the 
contingencies that influence scientific behavior is to ask 
about the outcomes to which the scientific product 
contributes. Do its outcomes lie a pragmatic continuum 
ranging from prediction and control of particular events at 
one end to the discovery of uniformities, the ordering of 
confusing data, the resolution of puzzlement at the other 
end?  Behavior analysis endorses any of these types of 
contributions. Alternatively, are its outcomes a matter of 
conforming to statements of revelation and authority, 
derived from a supposed domain beyond the natural 
world and with minimal regard to the outcome of 
interactions with the natural world?  For behavior 
analysis, mentalism is committed to this latter orientation, 
and the explanatory practices it promotes are problematic. 
An important feature of the above view is that for 
behavior analysis, scientific behavior is progressive and 
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continuous rather than dichotomous. That is, the 
systematic positions of such great scientists and 
theoreticians as Galileo, Newton, Darwin, Watson and 
Crick, and Hawking grew from observational data, either 
their own or those of others.  One type of scientific 
knowledge is not conceived of as a mere technology, 
concerned with application or engineering, and another 
type as a theoretical understanding, unconcerned with 
application and mutually exclusive from the first type. 
The first type is not conceived of as a rather pedestrian 
endeavor, and the second type as intellectually superior 
and therefore more deserving of esteem and recognition.  
Finally, behavior analysis is not conceived of as a to-be-
disparaged instance of the first type, and mentalism as a 
to-be-revered instance of the second type.  For sure, 
different forms of scientific activity may be found at 
different loci on the continuum, but an important 
consideration is that the forms are related, rather than 
dichotomous. To distinguish the forms as does mentalism 
betrays a metaphysics and an epistemology that depart 
from naturalistic concerns and an understanding of the 
human behavior that produced those forms. 
 
IMPLICATION #1: WHY DO SCIENTISTS DO 
SCIENCE? 
Why then do scientists do science? For behavior 
analysis, doing science is occasioned by particular 
antecedent circumstances, and maintained by particular 
outcomes. Sidman (1960) identified several reasons why 
scientists conduct scientific research: (a) to evaluate 
hypotheses; (b) to indulge the investigator's curiosity 
about nature; (c) to try out a new method or technique; 
(d) to establish the existence of a phenomenon; and (e) to 
explore the (boundary) conditions under which a 
phenomenon occurs.  Note that some instances of science 
may well test hypotheses, but not all science need do so. 
Thus, research is activity that produces generalizable 
knowledge.  The ultimate aim is to create generalized 
verbal SDs for effective interaction with nature, even if 
the verbal products are abstract. 
IMPLICATION #2: RESEARCH METHODS 
 Research methods in behavior analysis are 
concerned with identifying classes of manipulations that 
promote direct, effective action.  These methods isolate 
those manipulations and their effects through various 
techniques (discrimination and reversal, probes, multiple 
baselines, control conditions, etc.) that rule out alternative or 
rival possibilities.  The extent to which various antecedent 
circumstances or characteristics of the population are 
relevant are then incorporated as necessary, for example, to 
identify class boundaries. 
In contrast, research methods in traditional 
psychology are based on inferential statistics and sampling 
techniques.  At issue is whether a particular observation is 
considered to be the metaphysical effect of the manipulation 
in question, as opposed to simply a random sampling error 
from a population of outcomes.  Pragmatic considerations, 
such as the clinical as opposed to statistical significance of 
the effect, are not ordinarily involved. 
 
IMPLICATION #3: DEMARCATION OF SCIENCE 
FROM NON-SCIENCE 
For behavior analysts, science is concerned with the 
pragmatic continuum above in the domain of the natural 
world, and it may be demarcated from non-science. Non-
technical statements suggest that science (a) is guided by 
natural law, (b) explains events in terms of natural law, (c) 
formulates explanations that are testable against 
observations, (d) offers explanations that are tentative and 
provisional, and (e) offers explanations that are potentially 
falsifiable, is to be concerned with the sources of control 
over scientific verbal behavior that are found in the natural 
world. Non-science is concerned with revelation and 
authority derived from a supposed domain beyond the 
natural world. Note that demarcation doesn’t necessarily 
turn on directly observed or directly manipulated vs not. Of 
course, we can ask for a scientific account of why 
individuals make fanciful, non-scientific statements.  
 
IMPLICATION #4: CRITERIA FOR EMPIRICALLY 
BASED PRACTICE 
 Criteria for empirically based practice at the level 
of a well-established treatment or therapeutic intervention 
typically include (a) at least two demonstrations of 
effectiveness, or a series of single-case designs; (b) by at 
least two different experimenters; (c) using a documented 
(e.g., via a manual) intervention with suitable independent 
and dependent variables; and (d) following a suitable 
experimental design, with controls for purposes of 
comparison.  In traditional psychology, these criteria are 
held to be met through a randomized clinical trial, with a 
group design, and evaluation of results by a test of statistical 
inference. Recently, a large series of single-case design 
experiments that demonstrate efficacy with good 
experimental design and results comparable to another 
established treatment has also been taken to be satisfactory. 
These criteria aren’t stated in a way that is entirely 
consistent with a radical behaviorist orientation. 
Nonetheless, at least we see the concern with the reliability 
and validity of scientific verbal behavior in terms of the 
sources of control, much as behavior analysis suggests. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have seen that mentalism claims that behavior 
analysis deals only with observable S – R events and 
relations, whereas mentalism deals with underlying, 
unobservable theoretical structures. Consequently, 
mentalism argues that it is scientifically superior.  Again, 
this claim is complex.  For example, behavior analysis 
recognizes private behavioral events, which by definition are 
not publicly observable.  Some of these events are verbal, as 
in thinking and problem solving. The important 
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consideration here is that although these events are private, 
they are functionally related to environmental circumstances 
in the actor’s life, rather than innate in the same way that 
mental structures are said to be.  In this way, behavior 
analysis does recognize significant unobservable 
independent variables in an explanation of behavior.   As a 
result, the claims of mentalism are wide of the mark and 
uninformed. 
As important as a discussion of observable vs 
unobservable independent variables may be, perhaps an even 
more important distinction between mentalism and behavior 
analysis turns on their respective conceptions of verbal 
behavior.  For mentalism, verbal behavior is a referential, 
symbolic process. In this regard, words are symbols that 
have meaning. The meaning is a matter of what the words 
refer to. In some cases, the referent is publicly observable. In 
other cases, the referent is unobservable—a mental entity. 
For mentalism, in the case of psychology the mental referent 
is often some theoretical construct in the mind of the 
scientist, which then needs to be operationally defined so as 
to achieve agreement and avoid the pitfalls of introspective 
approaches.  Humans are conceived to be symbol using 
organisms, and the whole approach is said to follow from 
these assumptions. 
In contrast, behavior analysis regards verbal 
behavior as a form of operant behavior, amenable to analysis 
in terms of contingencies. The contingencies may be 
complex, but the analysis remains at the level of 
contingencies. It makes no more sense to say that a term or 
concept is a symbol that refers to something in the mind of 
the scientist than it does to say that stepping on the brake of 
a car is a symbol that refers to stopping in the mind of the 
driver. Representations and other features of mentalism are 
simply not involved. To attribute verbal behavior to symbol 
using and referential processes inextricably clouds the 
analysis. As we have seen, the central issues are the nature 
of the stimulus control and the nature of the reinforcement 
for the operant behavior called scientific. Mentalism often 
reifies concepts from our everyday language. Mentalism 
further assumes that the concepts so reified represent some 
sort of discrete entity or mental process with scientific 
relevance, even though the entity is in another domain. 
Behavior analysis suggests a different way to 
approach these matters.  For behavior analysis, the verbal 
process called abstraction is behavioral. Abstraction 
concerns stimulus control arising from one restricted aspect 
of the antecedent setting. No assumptions are made that (a) 
the named aspect represents some structure from another 
domain, (b) science is concerned with this structure as 
underlying observable events, and (c) observations stand as 
evidence for the existence of the structure. To so assume 
leads science down the garden path of ineffective 
interactions with the world. 
Behavior analysis is ultimately concerned about 
mentalism on pragmatic rather than ontological grounds.  
More specifically, behavior analysis argues that mentalism 
obscures and indeed actively impedes the search for 
important details about the genuinely relevant relations 
between behavior and environment, it allays curiosity by 
getting us to accept fanciful “explanatory fictions” as causes, 
it misrepresents the facts to be accounted for, and it gives us 
false assurances about the state of our knowledge.  
Consequently, behavior analysis argues that mentalism 
actually interferes with effective prediction, control, and 
explanation of behavior, despite mentalist claims to the 
contrary.  The conception of mental variables implies that 
they and the behavior they cause arise and operate relatively 
independently of environmental circumstances, and we can 
do nothing to promote beneficial forms of behavior or 
replace problematic forms, surely not an optimistic stance 
for a life science.  For behavior analysis, genuine answers 
concerning the causes and explanation of behavior may be 
found in the analysis of contingencies at the level of 
phylogeny, ontogeny, and culture. 
 
Key terms and concepts: behavior analysis, explanation, 
hypothetical constructs, mental structures, mentalism, 
scientific method, theory, verbal behavior. 
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